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“A Dangerous Man”: 
Lewis Terman and George Stoddard, 
their Debates on Intelligence Testing,  
and the Legacy of the Iowa Child 
Welfare Research Station 
STEVE MCNUTT 
IN 1886, on a farm south of Indianapolis in Johnson County, 
Indiana, a traveling salesman of books on phrenology stops for 
the night. Explaining to the family how phrenologists study the 
cranium for signs of mental abilities and personality traits, the 
salesman feels the bumps on the head of each of the Terman fam-
ily’s 14 children. The twelfth, a boy, approaches when called. 
Red hair parted down the middle, wearing round glasses, Lewis 
Terman is nine years old. He is overly aware of being different. 
For one thing, he likes school more than the other boys. Then 
there are the feelings of physical inferiority he will recall his 
entire life. And now someone is about to assess his intelligence. 
As tests go, the stakes are rather high.  
 The salesman lays his hands on Lewis’s head, spreading his 
fingers out wide to grasp his scalp. His touch is light, at times 
hovering over Lewis’s scalp. Working from Lewis’s forehead up 
to the crown of his head then down to each ear, he issues an oc-
casional “hmm” that to Lewis’s ears sounds—positive? Still not 
speaking, the salesman removes a set of steel calipers from his 
bag. He pinches skin behind ears still resonant with the scratch 
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of a penciled notation. He repeats the process. More notes and 
numbers follow, then the moment is over and the salesman 
grabs Lewis’s frail shoulders and pronounces to the room that 
when it comes to this boy’s future, he sees “great things.”  
 Lewis’s older brother buys a copy of the book, which Lewis 
finds fascinating into his early teens, and it inspires a lifelong 
love of reading. On his way to a Ph.D. in psychology he will 
learn French and German so that he can read works of psychol-
ogy and philosophy in their original languages. As a professor 
of psychology at Stanford University he will become known as 
one of the world’s foremost experts on intelligence testing and a 
vigorous advocate of the idea of intelligence as an unchanging, 
unitary trait based almost entirely on heredity.1
 On numerous occasions toward the end of his career, Terman 
will write about the visit, saying it affirmed his own intelligence 
and gave him confidence that he could do “great things.”2 Even 
though he later dismissed phrenology as pseudo-science, in that 
moment he had felt the hand of destiny, and it resonated with 
Terman, a man who would spend his career first advocating, 
then defending, the idea that environment—society—had little 
effect on the core intelligence of human beings and, by exten-
sion, on the ultimate direction of their lives. The depth of his 
resistance to the role of environment becomes clear in the story 
                                                 
1. The description of this event and its meaning for Terman’s life has been 
constructed based on several different sources. Of the many references to this 
story in which he interprets the event Terman writes, “Perhaps I remember 
the incident so well for the reason that when it came my turn to be examined 
he predicted great things of me. I think the prediction probably added a little 
to my self-confidence and caused me to strive for a more ambitious goal than 
I might otherwise have set. At any rate, I was greatly impressed and for sev-
eral years thereafter was much interested in phrenology. As my older brother 
bought a copy of the book, I finally became familiar with its contents and be-
lieved in phrenology until I was fourteen or fifteen years old. This was my 
introduction to the science of individual differences and the diagnosis of per-
sonality.” “Autobiography of Lewis M. Terman,” first published in Carl Mur-
chison, ed., History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 2 (Worcester, MA,  1930), 
297–331. The event is referenced in two biographies of Terman: Henry L. 
Minton, Lewis M. Terman: Pioneer in Psychological Testing (New York, 1988), 47; 
and Edwin G. Boring, Lewis Madison Terman, January 15, 1877–December 21, 
1956, Biographical Memoirs (National Academy of Sciences) vol. 33 (New 
York, 1959), 418. The description of “reading the bumps” is based on the 
common practices of phrenologists.  
2. “Autobiography of Lewis M. Terman,” 297–331. 
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Lewis M. Terman. Photo from NNDB.com. 
of his debates with researchers from the “Iowa school” of psy-
chology as defined by the work of the Iowa Child Welfare Re-
search Station (ICWRS), a state-funded project to research child 
development. Terman’s hereditarian views on intelligence are 
often portrayed as softening later in life, but that does not ap-
pear to be so when his views are examined within the context 
of his debates with the director of the ICWRS, George Stoddard, 
a person Terman would deem a “dangerous man.”  
 
BORN IN 1897, twenty years after Terman, in the coal-mining 
town of Carbondale, Pennsylvania, Stoddard was the fourth of 
five children. As an adult, he would defend the interactionist 
position, the argument that environment and intelligence influ-
ence one another. Of his own environment, he remembered his 
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father as the dominant presence in the family, a person who 
worked as a wrecking-crew foreman for the railroad, eventually 
giving that up to sell insurance. As one of the youngest children 
in his family, Stoddard remembered feeling “ornamental”; his 
older sisters would dress him up as a proper boy and dote upon 
him. Initially, he disliked school so much that he left during re-
cess of his first day in first grade. At home, his mother advised 
that he would probably miss something important if he did not 
go back, but if he wanted to stay he could, since she needed 
help with chores around the house. To school he returned. In 
some ways, he never left.3
 Raised Methodist, he lived in a world of rules and restric-
tions—no smoking, drinking, card playing, or reading of comic 
books. Sundays were spent indoors; he recalled watching from 
the window with envy as the Catholic kids played baseball out-
side. Economically, the town was in decline. Stoddard described 
life in Carbondale as “drab,” the municipal park “fenced in like 
a cemetery and just as lifeless,” the public library “puny and 
repulsive”—but life was made tolerable by the boy’s close prox-
imity to woods, hills, lakes, and kind neighbors.4  
 Age 12 marked the onset of Stoddard’s skepticism toward 
religion. He found “intolerable the wooden answers to burning 
questions.” With a group of friends he “literally stalked out of 
the little church school never to return.” At about the same time, 
he was first exposed to “communal violence linked to irrational 
dogma” when he witnessed a group of men throwing rocks and 
bricks through the windows of a Baptist church. The male wor-
shipers confronted the other men, but the police did not respond. 
Stoddard later learned that the police force was largely Catholic 
and the mob was made up of Catholics trying to disrupt the ser-
mon of a visiting preacher known for anti-Catholic messages. 
From this event, Stoddard concluded that religion was a source 
of violence and division.5  
 Becoming a nominal Unitarian later in life, he sought a spir-
itual path, reaching beyond “work and play.” In Unitarianism 
                                                 
3. George Stoddard, The Pursuit of Education (New York, 1981), 7–8. 
4. Ibid., 9. 
5. Ibid., 12. 
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George Stoddard in the late 1930s. Photo from F. W. 
Kent Collection, University Archives, University of 
Iowa Libraries, Iowa City. 
he found “a liberalizing religion devoid of cant.”6 His early 
doubts about religion appear as a critical moment that would 
eventually lead to his criticism of hereditarian views on intelli-
gence and intelligence testing. In his view, hereditarian thinking 
and religion were similar: Humans had created God in the same 
way they created concepts of an all-encompassing heredity in 
which everything was explained and dictated by genetics.7
 One other experience may have influenced Stoddard’s hesi-
tance to explain life through genetics. While he was still a child, 
                                                 
6. Ibid., 320–25. 
7. Ibid., 329–33. 
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his eldest brother, Arthur, had left home and lived a hard but 
adventurous life including travel at sea. Arthur returned home 
at age 30 with what Stoddard described as an incurable liver 
illness. He died the day before Stoddard’s high school com-
mencement, at which Stoddard, as class salutatorian, gave the 
opening address. He was coming to its conclusion when “there 
swam before my eyes a corpse—my brother’s rosy-cheeked face 
magically restored to life and intimacy! How long this fantasy 
lasted I do not know; no one ever mentioned a hesitation in my 
delivery. But I remember tightly shutting my eyes and, behold, 
the image floated away and the closing words of my speech 
came back to me.”8
 
INTERACTIONISTS like Stoddard argued that the “natural” 
aspect of the hereditarian argument provided a rationale for 
justifying inequality. The story behind the mechanism used 
to do so begins with the creation of the Binet-Simon Scale in 1904. 
Alfred Binet, director of the Sorbonne’s Laboratory of Experi-
mental Psychology in France, and Theodore Simon grounded 
their work on that of Sir Francis Galton, the founder of the 
eugenics movement and Charles Darwin’s cousin. The Binet-
Simon Scale was designed at the request of the minister of pub-
lic instruction in France to identify “subnormal” children “un-
suited” for a mainstream, mandatory schooling environment. 
The result was the world’s first test for intelligence. The test at-
tempted to set standards for age-appropriate tasks requiring 
abilities not taught in school such as judgment, memory, atten-
tion, and problem-solving skills. Yet Binet warned against the 
test’s potential for misuse, calling the notion that intelligence 
could not be improved a “brutal pessimism.” Nor did he agree 
that the term intelligence quotient was capable of representing 
intelligence with a single number—the idea that drove the crea-
tion of “IQ.”9  
 The idea that a single number could describe someone’s in-
telligence was the work of the German psychologist Wilhelm 
Stern. He proposed the concept of “mental age,” from which he 
                                                 
8. Ibid., 9. 
9. Theta H. Wolf, Alfred Binet (Chicago, 1973), 172, 178. 
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claimed to derive a person’s “intelligence quotient” (IQ), a leap 
in reasoning that Binet’s colleague Simon called la trahison—the 
betrayal, or treachery — for its redefinition of the test’s results. 
Neither he nor Binet accepted the equation behind IQ as math-
ematically valid or used the term, preferring the intentionally 
vague term “mental level.”10 Binet was confident that he and 
Simon had authored a test that could help to identify children 
of below-average intelligence, but he did not believe that the 
test measured the “richness of intelligence,” a concept he re-
fused to define or hypothesize about.11 Even though intelligence 
testing was a French creation, it became much more popular in 
the United States than in France. The French preferred to rely 
on the judgment of experts evaluating individuals rather than 
cede that role to a test.12
 After the psychologist and eugenicist Henry Goddard ini-
tially translated and introduced the Binet-Simon Scale to the 
United States, Lewis Terman revised, expanded, and marketed 
the test as well as the concept of IQ. He produced its numerical 
scale for assessing intelligence by using the test to determine 
a “mental age” score. That score was then divided by the test-
taker’s chronological age and multiplied by 100.  
 After producing a few relatively short versions of the test, 
in 1916 Terman published The Measurement of Intelligence, an 
expanded version that would launch the testing industry. Part 
test and part manifesto, the book employs every racial stereo-
type of the era alongside a distrust of teachers, a preference for 
tests, and a belief in intelligence as a “unitary,” that is, a single, 
uniform trait.13 In an inspired move toward co-opting Binet’s 
work and reputation, Terman dedicated the book to his memory. 
By then, Binet had died, and his qualifications about his test 
were soon forgotten, especially in the United States. 
 In Terman’s explanation of what would become known as 
the Stanford-Binet IQ Test, we hear a voice that is unequivocal 
in its worldview. 
                                                 
10. Ibid., 195, 203. 
11. Ibid., 215. 
12. John Carson, The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the 
French and American Republics, 1750–1940 (Princeton, NJ, 2007), 5.  
13. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 46–48. 
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Among laboring men and servant girls there are thousands like 
them [feebleminded individuals]. They are the world’s “hewers 
of wood and drawers of water.” And yet, as far as intelligence is 
concerned, the tests have told the truth. . . . No amount of school 
instruction will ever make them intelligent voters or capable citi-
zens in the true sense of the word. . . . 
 The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary fre-
quency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite for-
cibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits 
will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. . . . 
 Children of this group should be segregated in special classes 
and be given instruction which is concrete and practical. They 
cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient 
workers, able to look out for themselves. There is no possibility at 
present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to 
reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute 
a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding.14
 
POPULAR EXCITEMENT about the potential uses of intelli-
gence testing was a product of circumstance. Fears of increasing 
immigration drove some to want to verify who was worthy of 
citizenship. It was anticipated that future population and eco-
nomic growth would rely on immigration. Confronted with a 
perceived need to rely on the labor of potentially “substandard” 
people, the hereditarians believed that the country needed to 
preserve traditional power structures and avenues to privilege 
for those who were defined as white Americans, in case they be-
came a minority. Intelligence tests painted a gloss of objectivity 
on the idea of a meritocracy, and the imported Binet-Simon 
Scale was retrofitted to advance the hereditarians’ goal.15
 Growing public interest in and acceptance of the viability 
of the IQ test was a product of World War I. In the latter stages 
of the war, the U.S. army began to use a version of the IQ test as 
a means of sorting recruits. After initial resistance, many politi-
cians and high-ranking military leaders accepted the test, while 
                                                 
14. Lewis Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence: An Explanation of and Com-
plete Guide for the Use of the Stanford Revision and Extension of The Binet-Simon 
Intelligence Scale (New York, 1916), 91–92. 
15. A. J. Jaffe, “Population Growth and Fertility Trends in the United States,” 
Eugenical News 2 (1941), 26, 64–68. 
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seasoned officers resisted, and many simply refused to take it. 
In practice, the test was poorly administered in large halls where 
it was difficult for test-takers to hear instructions. As a result, a 
large percentage of soldiers scored as mentally handicapped. 
The army objected that, instead of measuring intelligence, the test 
measured familiarity with a question’s content as well as speed. 
Nonetheless, the results would be publicized in the popular press 
after the war as evidence of a crumbling society, feeding debates 
about the influence of immigrants, people of non–Western Euro-
pean backgrounds, and Communists. Still, the IQ test had gained 
a foothold as a tool for large-scale institutional use.16
 As the IQ test’s popularity increased, so did its number of 
detractors, who noted several problems related to the army’s 
questions about what the test was testing. Inventiveness was not 
rewarded, and some answers were simply arbitrary and confus-
ing. But the main problem was that the questions were highly 
subjective. The range of acceptable answers was narrow because 
the norms had been established by administering the test solely 
to white, middle-class children and using their experience as the 
basis for defining what qualified as a correct answer. Test ques-
tions commonly used illustrations of white, middle-class life, 
then asked test-takers to interpret the scenes.17 Questions that 
did not rely on illustrations presented similar problems. The fol-
lowing question, which Terman added to Binet’s original test, 
exemplifies how IQ tests used questions that read like riddles to 
evaluate a test-taker’s abstract reasoning skills: 
An Indian who had come to town for the first time in his life saw a 
white man riding along the street. As the white man rode by, the 
Indian said—“The white man is lazy; he walks sitting down.” What 
was the white man on that caused the Indian to say, “He walks 
sitting down.” 18
The answer identified as correct was “bicycle” because the In-
dian describes the white man as “walking,” meaning he must 
be observing up-and-down leg movement. The most common 
incorrect answer was “horse,” which Terman deemed incorrect 
                                                 
16. Carson, The Measure of Merit, 208–10. 
17. George Stoddard, The Meaning of Intelligence (New York, 1943), 103. 
18. Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York, 1996), 206. 
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because a person’s legs do not go up and down while riding a 
horse. In addition, the test-taker was supposed to read the ques-
tion as inferring that the Indian was unfamiliar with the object, 
and presumably he would not be unfamiliar with a horse.  
 Critics of this question and others like it observed that while 
it claimed to test abstract reasoning, it actually measured con-
formity and familiarity with social norms. The question really 
tested the degree to which a person viewed an Indian as a primi-
tive unfamiliar with modern technology; it measured the test-
taker’s ability to think abstractly not as an Indian thinks but as 
Terman thought of Indians, that is, to share Terman’s perception 
of the Indian’s behavior, psychology, and intellect. 
 Writing in The New Republic starting in 1922, the journalist 
Walter Lippmann and educational reformer John Dewey levied 
a series of related criticisms at the intelligence-testing community. 
They identified methodological problems with intelligence tests 
and warned of the potential outcome for a society that relied on 
them. Lippmann wrote six articles criticizing Terman’s interpre-
tation of the data, concluding that Terman could not demon-
strate that he was testing what he claimed to be testing. The IQ 
test, feared Lippmann, amounted to an assault on democratic 
ideals of self-determination likely to evolve into an “intellectual 
caste system in which the task of education had given way to 
the doctrine of predestination and infant damnation.”19 Dewey 
added that the IQ’s “abstract and universal idea of superiority 
and inferiority is an absurdity.”20  
 Terman responded in a 3,400-word article in The New Re-
public. Using a dismissive and condescending tone, he ignored 
Lippmann’s questions and, as became his habit, mischaracter-
ized the criticism as asserting that no differences of any kind ex-
isted between individuals. Comparing Lippmann’s critique of 
intelligence testing to William Jennings Bryan’s attack on evo-
lution, he sarcastically agreed with Lippmann, saying it was 
“high time we penetrated the wiles of this crafty cult.” He then 
expressed false distress as to the worldwide popularity of his 
                                                 
19. Walter Lippmann, “The Mental Age of Americans,” The New Republic, 
10/25/1922, 213–15; 11/1/1922, 246–48; 11/8/1922, 275–77; 11/15/1922, 297–
98; 11/22/1922, 328–30; 11/19/1922, 9–11. 
20. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 105. 
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views on intelligence. Referring to Germany as being “taken in” 
by such views, he wrote that if “the German people don’t wake 
up they will soon find themselves in the grip of a super-junker 
[landed nobility] caste that will out-junker anything Prussia 
ever turned loose.” Lippmann, stated Terman, was not intelli-
gent enough to understand intelligence testing. Science, he con-
cluded, should be left to the scientists.21  
 The reaction was typical of Terman’s response to those who 
questioned the validity of his tests. In a variety of publications 
and speeches he stated that the answer to the questions they 
raised was too obvious to merit an answer. Doubts about social 
stratification and its roots received similarly superficial treat-
ment in The Measurement of Intelligence. “Common observation,” 
he wrote, “would itself suggest that the social class to which the 
family belongs depends less on chance than on the parents’ na-
tive qualities of intellect and character.”22 Such statements por-
tray science as a matter of faith; when it suited him, “common 
observation” was all the proof he required.  
 Terman’s selective use of evidence is reflected in the expla-
nation he offered as a way to understand his own life. Aside 
from the chance encounter with phrenology that sparked his 
passion for reading, growing up on the farm offered Terman lit-
tle evidence that his success was based in anything but heredity. 
He could see nothing about his early life that helped prepare 
him for his future success. He was a sickly child who, at various 
points in his life, struggled with tuberculosis. He never enjoyed 
sports or other physical activities. Instead, he developed academic 
interests along with a competitive and tireless work ethic. Terman 
concluded that his forebears’ intelligence had never presented 
itself because they had lacked access to means of (academic) 
expression.23 Terman also attributed his son’s election to the 
                                                 
21. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 102–4; Lewis M. Terman, “The Great Conspiracy, 
or the Impulse Imperious of Intelligence Testers, Psychoanalyzed and Exposed 
by Mr. Lippmann,” The New Republic, 12/27/1922, 116–20. 
22. Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence, 115. 
23. As his biographers have noted, Terman himself benefited from private 
loans facilitating his education, from undergraduate through doctoral work, 
and he also had a spouse who was supportive of his ambitions. Boring, Lewis 
Madison Terman, 415–61. 
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National Academy of Sciences to heredity, though neither his 
daughter nor any of his siblings achieved such notoriety.24 In 
using selective individuals from his family as evidence of the 
inevitable consequences of heredity, Terman disregarded fam-
ily members who, while biologically related, did not share the 
same traits as he did. That allowed him to make one of the more 
nuanced missteps behind hereditarian notions of intelligence: 
the assertion that group-based classifications can be used to 
predict with certainty who we become as individuals. 
 
NEITHER STODDARD NOR TERMAN came from extraor-
dinary wealth. Both received an exceptionally high level of for-
mal education for a period when only approximately 10 percent 
of high school graduates attended college. Politically, both were 
liberal Democrats. Stoddard was 11 years younger and a true 
New Deal Democrat, but Stoddard’s upbringing was more priv-
ileged than Terman’s and allowed for more diversions, which, 
by accident rather than design, became vital to his views on in-
telligence. After working at a bank after graduation from high 
school, Stoddard enrolled at Penn State. He tried industrial 
chemical engineering, left for a short stint in the army, then re-
turned to Penn State and mathematics, physics, and other hard 
sciences. None held his interest, and he repeatedly found him-
self in the humanities, ultimately settling on a degree in educa-
tion, followed, in 1923, by a year of graduate study in psychology 
at the University of Paris with Theodore Simon. 25  
 Stoddard had initially intended to study in Germany. The 
field of modern psychology dates to 1879, when the first formal 
laboratory of experimental psychology was founded at the Uni-
                                                 
24. Later in his career, Terman modifed his initial view that men were, on aver-
age, more intelligent than women. His biographer speculated as to how his 
earlier notion may have affected his treatment and expectations of his own 
children, who were routinely given intelligence tests in their youth (as were 
his grandchildren). Terman devoted much of his parenting energy to his son, 
Frederick; he had a distant relationship with his daughter, Anna. Frederick 
would echo his father’s accomplishments; he became a professor of engineer-
ing at Stanford and, like his father, was elected to the National Academy of 
Sciences. Anna, as expected, married and became a mother, living close to 
home for the rest of her life. Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 257–59. 
25. Stoddard, The Pursuit of Education, 321–23. 
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versity of Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt. (Wundt would train the 
American psychologist G. Stanley Hall, under whom Lewis 
Terman studied). Leipzig, then, was the obvious destination for 
Stoddard. But German psychologists, motivated by Germany’s 
slow recovery from World War I and Hitler’s growing power, 
left for the United States, where many of their former students 
were teaching. If Stoddard wanted to study with German psy-
chologists, there was no need to leave the United States, and he 
had already been exposed to many of their ideas; France, by con-
trast, was politically stable, and its theorists were more appealing 
to Stoddard, who described them as intuitive and brilliant.26  
 In Paris, Stoddard encountered Binet’s original work directly. 
Stateside U.S. students in educational psychology, who knew 
about Binet’s scale, had less contact with the reasoning behind 
its creation and its authors’ own caveats about the test and its 
imperfections. That made it easier for students to become en-
tranced by the seemingly unassailable exactitude offered by 
the test’s results and thus to come to see evidence of biological 
determinism as the chief engineer of intelligence.27
 After a year of study in France, Stoddard accepted a research 
assistantship at the University of Iowa. There, he went to work 
for G. M. Ruch, a professor who had studied at Stanford. Their 
task was testing the general intelligence of incoming freshmen, 
but they struggled to find correlations between their results and 
students’ level of success.28  
 Stoddard’s dissertation, “Iowa Placement Examinations” 
(1925) attempted to solve the problem of student assessment. 
Built on the idea that designing a generalized test able to encap-
sulate a person’s capacity for building knowledge was a practi-
cal impossibility, Stoddard’s solution was two tests: one testing 
aptitude for learning, the other testing what the person already 
knew.29 Those tests were more successful at predicting student 
                                                 
26. Ibid., 327. 
27. Ibid., 329. 
28. Ibid., 39. Stoddard would also coauthor a book with Ruch on testing high 
school students, for which Terman wrote a long introduction. Through Ruch, 
Terman offered Stoddard a fellowship if he would transfer to Stanford. It was 
an offer Iowa could not match, but Stoddard elected to stay in Iowa City.  
29. Ibid., 39. 
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achievement and were eventually adopted by the university. 
He went on to write a series of tests used throughout the United 
States as placement exams.  
 By this stage of his education, however, Stoddard had 
enough experience with testing to understand its weaknesses. 
He never developed a faith in a particular test’s ability to quan-
tify an ultimate truth. His awareness of the University of Iowa’s 
poor initial experience with intelligence tests and his own author-
ship of other tests would influence how he viewed the rapid 
adoption of standardized tests of all kinds at all educational lev-
els by those who saw them as tools for bringing order to society.  
 
STODDARD’S GRADUATE STUDIES had begun two years 
after the founding of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station 
(ICWRS) in 1917.30 Achieving funding for the research station 
took years of wrangling with the state legislature; psychology 
was still a relatively new field, and the idea of studying children 
invited suspicion. Public opinion was swayed thanks in part to 
newspaper editorials pointing out that the state spent more 
time and money studying its hogs than its children. As an ex-
ample of what happens when children are not given adequate 
educational opportunities, newspaper editors pointed to the 
recent rejection of “thousands” of “normal” Iowa men as unfit 
for military service.31 With victory in the battle for funding, the 
university turned a series of houses into offices, a preschool 
nursery, and a library—all dedicated to studying the “normal” 
child. Lewis Terman was offered the directorship of the pro-
gram. This story would have had developed very differently 
had he not turned it down.32
 In Before Head Start, historian Hamilton Cravens describes 
the ICWRS as possibly the first research institute in the world 
and certainly in the United States dedicated solely to conduct-
ing original scientific research on the development of “normal” 
                                                 
30. Pioneering in Child Welfare: A History of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station 
1917–1933 (Iowa City, 1933), 25. 
31. The U of I’s Institute of Child Behavior Celebrates Its First 50 Years (Iowa City, 
1968). 
32. Hamilton Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America’s Children 
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1993), 104. 
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children, and the first with a preschool nursery for research pur-
poses.33 Throughout its first decade, the ICWRS had limited 
funds and a small staff, but by 1928 increased state and grant 
funding allowed it to achieve national prominence. Shortly 
thereafter, its first director, Bird T. Baldwin, died suddenly.  
 That same year the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the consti-
tutionality of laws mandating the sterilization of mentally handi-
capped people, along with laws requiring all citizens to have 
racial designations listed at birth, thus codifying the “one-drop 
rule.” The sterilization laws were derived from the 1922 publi-
cation of Harry Laughlin’s Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, 
which relied on the claims of hereditarians.34  
 In that context George Stoddard took a job he did not want. 
Stoddard liked to joke that the university president chose him 
to succeed Baldwin as director of the ICWRS out of simple des-
peration. Stoddard had never intended a career as an adminis-
trator, but in 1928, three years after completing his doctorate in 
child psychology, with 15 published research articles and as 
one of the original authors of the Iowa Placement Tests (which 
attempted to assess learning by grade level), he agreed to a one-
year interim term as director of the ICWRS.35 Hired as an interim 
director, he did not behave as one. The research station’s mis-
sion quickly shifted from one originally intent on intervention 
in critically at-risk families to one focused on studying child-
hood development in a way never before attempted.  
 Correspondence from that year demonstrates the reputation 
Stoddard had developed within the university. The dean of the 
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Gertrude E. Chittenden observes children at play in the Iowa Child Wel-
fare Research Station’s preschool for her thesis research in 1941. Photo 
from F. W. Kent Collection, University Archives, University of Iowa. 
Graduate College, Carl Seashore, wrote to university president 
Walter Jessup to “join” in recommending Stoddard’s promotion 
from assistant to associate professor, as his growth had been 
“rather remarkable.” Seashore made it clear that people in Stod-
dard’s field were in high demand; he worried that Stoddard 
might be tempted to look elsewhere.36
 Seashore’s effort to retain Stoddard was successful. Under 
Stoddard’s leadership, work by ICWRS researchers Beth Well-
man, Marie Skodak, Ruth Updegraff, and Howard Skeels re-
peatedly questioned what IQ was and whether it was, as he-
reditarians claimed, a fixed, unitary trait. Along with Skeels, 
Wellman authored numerous Iowa studies. In 1932 she wrote 
the first of many articles on the effects of schooling on intellect. 
She questioned whether intelligence was innate. One of the ear-
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lier ICWRS studies had found a greater increase in student IQ 
scores between the fall and spring semesters, when school was 
in session, than when it was not in session, implying that im-
proved scores relied at least partly on education.37 The heredi-
tarians dismissed the findings, saying that the Iowa researchers 
were not properly trained and did not understand IQ. This began 
a pattern in which ICWRS research was rejected by others in the 
intelligence-testing community.  
 
SEVERAL OF THE ICWRS STUDIES took place at the Iowa 
Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home in Davenport, Iowa. The lead study 
was titled, quite transparently, “A Study of Environmental 
Stimulation: An Orphanage Preschool Project.” Its genesis was 
a problem facing the Orphans’ Home and its supervising body, 
the State Board of Control. After settling a lawsuit by an Iowa 
couple who learned that their adoptive child was mentally 
handicapped, the Orphans’ Home administrators became con-
cerned about the potential for other parents to adopt a child 
who might be “feeble-minded.” Motivated by the desire to 
avoid future lawsuits, they contacted Stoddard to help them 
determine the level of intelligence of the children in their care.38
 The ICWRS researchers found an orphanage comprising 
several cottages, each housing 30–35 children of the same sex 
and younger than six years of age. The largest room in each cot-
tage was 15 square feet. One trained adult and three or four un-
trained teenaged girls were responsible for the children’s care. 
By necessity, the children lived a rigid, regimented life, isolated 
from the outside world. Treated as a group with no personal 
belongings besides a toothbrush (clothing was shared), the 
children, according to the Iowa researchers, struggled to see 
themselves as individuals and moved en masse. Many were not 
toilet trained or capable of washing themselves.39
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Two boys play in front of the boys’ cottages at the Iowa Soldiers’ Orphans’ 
Home, probably in the 1920s or early 1930s. Photo from State Historical 
Society of Iowa, Iowa City. 
 In 1935, at the center of the ring of cottages, the ICWRS, 
with the help of state funding, built a preschool costing $7,280 
(about $115,000 in today’s dollars). For the next three years, the 
ICWRS tracked children grouped by age and IQ scores, moni-
toring the progress of those who attended the preschool and 
those who did not. All of the children had been at the orphan-
age for 18–21 months and ranged in age from 18 months to 5 
years. The study was a small one of 46 children enrolled in the 
preschool and 44 whose daily routine remained unchanged.40 
The researchers remained skeptical of what the IQ test truly 
tested but used it nonetheless because it was the commonly 
accepted standard of the era. They expected the IQs of those 
attending the preschool to rise precipitously.  
 Instead, over the three years of the study, they saw inconsis-
tent and modest gains among children enrolled in the preschool. 
The real surprise was the effect of long residency at the orphan-
age on those in the control group. Instead of staying static, as 
expected, the effect “was a leveling one, tending to bring all 
children [regardless of initial IQ score] to high-grade feeble-
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mindedness or borderline classification” (IQ range of 70–79). 
The two children in the control group with the highest initial 
scores lost 28.5 points, and two others lost 43 and 37 points.41 
The authors of the study concluded that the preschool’s main 
effect was to prevent further harm to the children’s scores and, 
presumably, their psychological and educational development. 
It was a nuanced difference—the difference between improving 
children’s developmental potential and protecting them from 
an environment hazardous to that development.  
 The results strongly suggested the malleability of intelligence 
and raised questions about what the word even meant—and the 
ICWRS researchers had achieved those results by employing 
the same tool Lewis Terman had used to support the opposite 
position. Terman’s IQ test was not the ICWRS researchers’ only 
method of assessment, however; his IQ test and one not associ-
ated with Stanford or Terman produced similar results. Addi-
tional tests of language and vocabulary showed both groups 
lagging well behind children of similar ages in Iowa City. Even 
with the addition of the preschool, the children did not receive 
enough language stimulation, and they had little access to books 
and other means of promoting language development. 
 General information tests produced similar results when 
their results were compared to those of test-takers in the world 
outside the orphanage. Nevertheless, the preschool group—
despite its modest improvements—always did better than the 
control group when assessed using intelligence tests as well 
as other measures. One important area in which the preschool 
group improved most markedly was in social maturity—a “pro-
gressive capacity for looking after themselves”—which was im-
portant for placement with an adoptive family. In the area of 
motor skills (hopping, skipping, climbing ladders, jumping), the 
preschool children’s scores approached those of Iowa City chil-
dren.42 At the study’s conclusion, the staff was convinced of the 
preschool’s value even before they saw the report, so all of the 
children were enrolled in the preschool, playground equipment 
was added, and the child-to-adult ratio reduced. 
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IN CONTRAST to their dismissive view of critics like Lipp-
mann, the hereditarians took the work of Stoddard and the 
ICWRS as a direct threat. They feared that “environmentalists” 
would succeed in demonstrating the role of environmental 
factors in human development. Such a heretical notion would 
have consequences. Intelligence testing had reified as “natural” 
essentialist notions about race, gender, and social class. The re-
search produced by the ICWRS was a threat not just to that idea 
but also to the entire social structure it supported. 
 For Terman and other adherents of a strict hereditarian view, 
if the IQ test did measure intelligence and if intelligence was 
fixed, the results at the Iowa Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home simply 
were not possible. Terman worked to ensure that psychologists 
and the public ignored or dismissed the ICWRS findings. On July 
7, 1939, at his behest, Stanford University’s School of Education 
convened a symposium before an audience of 1,200 teachers and 
school administrators with the goal of putting to rest questions 
about the relationship between genetics and environment in de-
termining a person’s intelligence. To address this complex ques-
tion, Terman and his supporters were allotted an hour; Stoddard, 
upon arriving in Palo Alto, learned that he would have ten min-
utes to defend his claim that intelligence was not fixed.43  
 In his presentation, Terman dismissed the ICWRS studies 
that found that preschool attendance resulted in higher IQ scores. 
He reserved special ire for an ICWRS follow-up study on chil-
dren from the orphanage who had been placed in foster and 
adoptive homes. Both preschool and control group children 
with relatively high IQs had been placed; those with lower IQs 
had not. After placement, individual children from both the pre-
school and control groups increased their IQ scores the longer 
they were with their foster or adoptive families, with children 
who had been in the preschool making more substantial gains. 
Their IQs eventually came to more closely resemble those of 
their foster or adoptive parents than of their birth mothers (little 
was known about the fathers). The children who remained in the 
orphanage did not make any gains by the end of the project.44
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 At the Palo Alto symposium, Terman responded to the claim 
that environment influenced individual intelligence by assailing 
the data, demanding additional proof, and asserting that others 
had not been able to replicate the results. In argument, nuance 
failed to hold Terman’s interest. Using rhetoric as dichotomous 
as his science, he mischaracterized the Iowa results into an exag-
gerated inversion of his own, claiming (falsely) that the research-
ers believed they had “demonstrated the possibility of almost 
unlimited IQ control.”45 Stoddard responded by presenting the 
data from Iowa as well as other universities, to no avail. In his 
autobiography, he quoted the symposium’s chairman as con-
fessing after the symposium that “I held Stoddard while Ter-
man beat him.” Neutral observers found Terman rude and be-
lieved that he had “made a fool out of himself.”46  
 No complete copy exists of Stoddard’s ten-minute response 
in Palo Alto, but the record does contain some revealing excerpts. 
Mulling over the twists of the debate over the previous years, 
Stoddard announced that he was not going to fuel Terman’s 
arguments by offering statements Terman would then misrep-
resent. In unraveling the claims of hereditarians, he said, having 
followed “the devious course of many a colored yarn, I shall not 
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undertake to supply the woof to anybody’s warp.”47 Even so, 
the child, he said, is plastic; intelligence tests are imperfect and 
irrational. Many of the test questions relied on familiarity with 
cultural norms and thus their results measured cultural differ-
ences. They have value, said Stoddard, but more as measures of 
environmental influences than of intelligence.48 Terman, after-
ward, wrote to a friend that Stoddard was a “dangerous man.”49  
 Terman would fail in his efforts to prevent the ICWRS stud-
ies from gaining public attention, yet even when they did the 
ideas were often incorrectly portrayed as a question of nature 
versus nurture rather than emphasizing an interactive relation-
ship between environment and intelligence, of nature and nur-
ture working in concert. An article in early October of that year 
in the Salt Lake Tribune was one of many reflecting this common 
misinterpretation. Citing the Iowa studies, it encouraged parents 
to get their children tested. IQ could be raised, the article claimed, 
because environment had more to do with intelligence than he-
redity. The first assertion accurately reflected the Iowa findings, 
but the second was stretched even more by the declaration that 
“geniuses can be made as well as born”—a significant leap from 
Stoddard’s koan-like equivocation that “the child can only be 
what he could have become.”50
 Stoddard, in assessing the hereditarians and how they co-
opted Binet’s test, wrote that Terman and others simply did not 
respect the qualifications Binet made about the limits of his test. 
A primary concern of Stoddard’s was that IQ tests relied on the 
thinnest of evidence. The test used by Terman to identify genius 
in high school students consisted of the following: a vocabulary 
test requiring a mastery of only 13,500 words; a visualization 
test involving folding paper, cutting holes, and predicting how 
many would be revealed upon unfolding; repeating digits in 
forward and reverse order; explaining text that Stoddard de-
scribed as “elementary”; and answering questions about how to 
measure pints of water.  
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 In addition, Stoddard was confounded by the hereditarians’ 
habit of protecting the test at all cost. Having asserted that the 
IQ test did measure intelligence, and that intelligence was fixed, 
they evaluated the results based on whether those results con-
formed to the expectation that a person tested repeatedly would 
consistently produce identical scores. When scores were incon-
sistent, Stoddard said, the hereditarians’ were more concerned 
to protect the test’s reputation than to understand the student. 
The confusion is this: if we find some external physical “reason” 
for poor test performance, we tend to discount the testing; if the 
“reason” remains obscure, locked up in the internal mechanism 
of the organism, we tend to accept the results as bona fide. . . . 
Neither test constructor nor clinician hesitates to say that a child’s 
brightness has remained static when the IQ is constant; when he 
finds the IQ inconstant, particularly if the change is radical, then 
what has changed is something other than brightness!51
 
IN THE LATTER STAGES of Terman’s career, his views on 
intelligence reveal some inconsistencies. Biographers, as well as 
many textbooks on the history of psychology, quote Ernest R. 
Hilgard’s 1957 obituary of Terman in which Hilgard implies 
that Terman eventually modified his hereditarian position on 
IQ and intelligence. In the obituary, Hilgard quotes a passage 
from Terman’s 1932 autobiography: “the major differences be-
tween children of high and low IQ, and the major differences 
in the intelligence test scores of certain races, as Negroes and 
whites, will never be fully accounted for on the environmental 
hypothesis.” In the margin of Terman’s personal copy, notes 
Hilgard, Terman penciled in, “I am less sure of this now (1951)! 
And still less sure in 1955! — L. M. T.”52
 At several points in his 1937 revision of the Stanford-Binet 
test, Terman’s analysis became less adamant in tone and con-
clusions than it had been in previous publications. For example, 
he notes that the mean values of differences between correlations 
of IQ scores with social class are too small to be significant.53 
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Certainly, this sounds like someone retreating from a central 
tenet of biodeterminism—the notion that social class is deter-
mined by heredity. Such moments invite questions about what 
Terman truly believed and suggest someone in conflict over 
deeply entrenched ideas. Thus, sympathetic observers argue 
that Terman modified his previous views. 
 In his published writing, however, Terman never expressed 
the degree of doubt found in the margins of his writing. Min-
ton argues that a desire to protect his professional reputation 
impeded his willingness to openly question his position.54 
Supporting Minton’s conclusion was Terman’s reaction to the 
ICWRS’s publication of A Study of Environmental Stimulation: 
An Orphanage Preschool Project. Even after the publication of 
Terman’s more reserved 1937 revision of the Stanford-Binet test, 
he continued to attack—in print and in public and without res-
ervation—the Iowa interactionists’ findings on intelligence.  
 A letter from Terman student Florence Goodenough reflects 
the hereditarians’ attitudes about the Iowa researchers. In the 
letter, sent to Leta Hollingworth, a researcher Terman respected 
despite views on intelligence less reliant on heredity than his 
own, Goodenough expressed her opinion of Beth Wellman. 
“The time had come,” she wrote, “for letting the Iowa people 
know something about how the land lies.” Terman, she wrote, 
believed that Wellman intentionally tried to deceive readers of 
her reports, while Goodenough believed that she had deceived 
herself. She compared Wellman to “a religious fanatic who hears 
the wings of angels in every rustle of the dishtowels on the fam-
ily clothes line.”55
 After the symposium in 1939, Terman successfully margin-
alized the ICWRS’s interactionist position. He continued to 
target Stoddard and the ICWRS whenever possible, managing 
to halt the momentum for a national nursery school program 
that Stoddard had advocated for most of the decade. It ad-
vanced as far as a speech at the White House, then died. The 
economic realities of the Great Depression played a role, but 
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Terman made its dismissal easier by arranging to have his 
symposium speech circulated among the right hands in official 
Washington. In language that does not sound like someone re-
considering his position, he would later boast of his success in 
“turning the tide” against Stoddard’s wishes for “moron nurse-
maids.”56  
 While Terman believed that IQ tests demonstrated the in-
significance of environmental factors, the Iowa researchers, led 
by Stoddard, advocated the opposite position, that IQ tests 
demonstrated the significance of environmental influence and 
should be used as indices of social change.57 (They would be, 
but not until the 1960s.58) The public and academic tides were 
with the Iowa researchers, and the shift in perceptions of intelli-
gence in the ten years between 1928 and 1938 can be partly cred-
ited for growth in support for New Deal legislation. Through-
out the period, the number of children in the workforce had 
reached its highest historical levels because of economic stress 
and Social Darwinist theories that validated variable treatment 
of children based on social rank. But by 1938, after many failed 
attempts, passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act mandated fed-
eral standards for child labor practices and signified critical 
changes in perceptions of a child’s place in society.  
 The changing perceptions of childhood development also 
affected the relative emphasis on formal education and its avail-
ability. One of the many ways this was manifested was in levels 
of high school enrollment. Before 1920 only a small percentage 
of children attended public high schools; by 1930 half did; and 
ten years later enrollment rose to two-thirds.59  
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 The mainstream psychological establishment had, from the 
outset, found Binet-derived scales “not sufficiently self-critical”; 
by the beginning of World War II, the hereditarian notions of 
Terman and others in the intelligence testing community had 
increasingly fallen out of favor.60 Complicating the question 
of what Terman truly believed, and raising the question as to 
whether the tenor of the debate between the two groups pushed 
both to take more extreme positions than they actually held, 
was Terman’s own statement in the 1940 Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education that the environment could not 
be “regarded as a matter of small consequence.”61
 
STODDARD would leave Iowa in 1942 to become New York 
State’s Commissioner of Education. A year later, reflecting on 
the debates over the meaning and testing of intelligence, Stod-
dard called fascination with the hereditarian idea of intelligence 
bad science that offered a false solution to society’s ills. He ar-
gued that the belief in intelligence as determined solely by bi-
ology, easily tested for and quantified as a single number and 
offered as a nearly singular explanation for human behavior, 
invited too much confidence in our ability to engineer a better 
future through a narrow lens focused on genetics and the brain. 
In The Meaning of Intelligence, a nearly 500-page rebuttal to the 
hereditarians, Stoddard, referring to the cerebral cortex as “our 
luxury of luxuries,” remarked,  
It takes no frontal tumor to knock out the brain. The abscesses of 
fear, magic, and murderousness serve equally well and are more 
readily distributed. . . . For the most deadly and universal mental 
afflictions, starting from the impact of man upon man, it is neces-
sary to postulate healthy tissues, in order that the phobia may take 
hold. . . . All the tumors the world has ever known have not been 
so destructive of human beings and human aspirations as single-
purpose concepts like witchcraft, divine right, original sin, heresy, 
racial superiority and might makes right. . . . Why is there such an 
ongoing interest in defining, measuring, and labeling racial charac-
teristics? Very likely the doctrine of racial inferiority . . . constitutes 
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a social need for millions of white persons who cannot otherwise 
escape the unpleasant outcomes of their own actions and attitudes.62  
 In 1945 Stoddard was hired as president of the University of 
Illinois, where he would gain a reputation, according to Charles 
Shadduck, a friend and professor in the English Department, of 
being generous and highly social but also someone who did not 
suffer fools. Stoddard himself would not have disagreed with 
such an assessment. He described himself as someone often ab-
sorbed within his own thoughts who could thus appear even 
deafer than he actually was. “Though hard-of-hearing at the 
best of times,” he wrote, his abstraction “imparts an air of re-
moteness or indifference to the speech of others.” 
It can become a source of unintentional rudeness but, I think, not of 
malice. My inner satisfactions relate to this ambivalence. I cannot 
pretend to be a hail-fellow-well-met, a hearty, grinning slapper of 
backs. I am guilty of the cold eye and the dour look. If persons bore 
me, I probably show it, although a bore by definition is the last one 
to notice. On the other hand, I am apt to “take fire” and display an 
emotionally tinged response. At such times I become compulsively 
articulate. The hardest stance for me is to remain cool to what I re-
gard as original and exciting, or, on the other hand, to what strikes 
me as stupid, corrupt, or malicious. My most intense pleasure is to 
be in touch with a warm creative person who represents what hu-
man nature is or could be.63
 When Stoddard was hired, the Illinois Alumni News de-
scribed him as “charming” and “highly-recommended.” Re-
porting on Stoddard’s forced resignation seven years later after 
he displeased the university’s politically conservative board of 
trustees, Time magazine described Stoddard as hot-tempered, 
with a reputation among state legislators for being “anything 
but diplomatic.”64 A typical “Stoddard story” from his years 
at Illinois recounts his reaction to a state legislator announcing 
in the press that there were “fifty red communist pinkos at the 
university.” Stoddard responded by sending the legislator a 
sheet of paper with blank lines numbered one to fifty along 
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with a note asking him to please supply the names. Shadduck 
described the exchange as a “typical Stoddard response to deal-
ing with a vicious idiot.”65
 With the arrival of GIs home from World War II and the 
new GI Bill’s support for them to attend college, the university’s 
enrollment doubled in Stoddard’s first year to more than 23,000. 
He oversaw a period of tremendous growth in the size and qual-
ity of the university, but after the election of a new, more politi-
cally conservative board of trustees, the outspoken and proudly 
liberal Stoddard became, in their view, an elitist easterner who 
wanted to create the “Harvard of the Midwest” and thus some-
one who should be regarded with suspicion. Once again, he 
was, in short, “a dangerous man.” 
 He lasted for seven years, from 1946 to 1953. A year before 
his dismissal Stoddard had become embroiled in a public dis-
pute with Andrew C. Ivy, the university’s vice-president and a 
popular physiologist who had begun producing and populariz-
ing Krebiozen, a drug that he claimed could cure cancer. It was 
derived from horse and cattle serum given to Ivy by two brothers 
in Argentina who never produced a powder testable by a third 
party. After a year of delays, Stoddard, relying on advisers in-
cluding the American Medical Association, ordered Ivy to stop 
using university facilities to produce and administer the drug. 
For this, Stoddard was accused of infringing on academic free-
dom. His somewhat imperious nature in dealing with the state 
legislature was cited as another reason for his dismissal by the 
board of trustees who, led by former football star Red Grange, 
produced a 6–3 vote of no confidence.66  
 Reports at the time and since noted the political and cultural 
forces behind the decision. Stoddard’s politics were well-known, 
as was his association with UNESCO and his image as an inter-
nationalist, an identity that made some uncomfortable. Stoddard 
was well liked on campus, where he was seen as a “scholar-
president.” He was a hero especially to the young faculty who, 
in many cases, had been recruited from out of state, an unpopu-
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lar move in the eyes of the legislature and board of trustees who 
feared the influence of “radicals.”67
 Stoddard was right about Krebiozen, which was never dem-
onstrated to offer an appreciable benefit (“horse piss” was one 
blunt description of the substance), although it did have nu-
merous side effects. Ivy evaded criminal charges, but his rep-
utation would remain that of a charlatan and media hound. 
Stoddard’s reputation suffered from association with the scan-
dal, and he had to defend himself in an 11-year court battle with 
Ivy, in which Stoddard was eventually exonerated.68  
 The university apparently preferred to forget the Stoddard 
era. No buildings bear his name, nor are there memorials or 
book collections in his name in the library. Hundreds of por-
traits line hallways and rooms in the university’s student union 
memorializing administrators, members of boards of trustees, 
professors, and famous alumni. So numerous and identical in 
size that they seem to blend into one identical image, they are 
the sort of paintings thousands pass without a glance, yet even 
among them Stoddard is conspicuously absent.  
 For someone who counseled General MacArthur on occupa-
tion strategies after World War II, helped found Parents maga-
zine, and served on the board of UNESCO, among other duties, 
his forced resignation was a humiliation. His career continued 
as dean of the School of Education then chancellor and vice-
president at New York University, with interludes sponsored 
by the State Department to postwar South Korea, where he 
evaluated educational needs. In Iran, he advised the Shah on the 
creation of a College of Education in the University of Tehran, 
a plan that died with the Shah. Stoddard then played a long-
running role advocating the development of public television. 
A New York Times obituary noted his tenure at Illinois and the 
Krebiozen controversy but did not mention his stewardship of 
the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station or his debates with 
Lewis Terman over intelligence testing.69  
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 It was at the University of Iowa, however, where he did some 
of his most important work as a defender of academic freedom— 
the principle he was accused of subverting at Illinois—and as an 
advocate and defender of unpopular ideas at a time when public 
opinion favored the hereditarian position of biological determin-
ism. His voice was not a solitary one, but for a critical period it 
was a persistent and high-profile voice defending research that 
delivered a deep psychological shock to prevailing views on 
intelligence and their relationship to ideas of a meritocracy. 
